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USING FORCE FIRST: MORAL 
TRADITION AND THE CASE FOR 
REVISION 
MARK TOTTEN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The four years that have elapsed since the United States boldly 
claimed the right to use preemptive force absent an imminent threat' have 
brought no calm to this roiled area of international law. "Preservationists" 
defend the standard recognized by states since at least the end of World War II, 
centered on the requirement of an imminent threat, and argue that relaxing this 
standard will yield more violence and less order. 2 "Revisionists" counter that 
the threat of global terrorism renders this standard incapable of providing states 
with the security they require. 3 Most scholarship in support of revision has 
focused on changed circumstances since 9/11: the threat of global terrorism 
and the failures of a standard that conditions preemptive force on the presence 
of an imminent threat. These arguments are crucial and, understandably, the 
focus of early efforts at fostering legitimacy. Equally important-and to this 
point in time overlooked-is a compelling argument that such a shift can 
Visiting Scholar, The George Washington University Law School. JD (2006) Yale Law 
School. PhD, Ethics (2006) Yale University. I wish to thank Gene Outka, James Turner Johnson, 
Paul Kahn, John Noyes, Stephen Carter, George Weigel, and the editors of the Stanford Journal of 
International Law for helpful discussions and comments on this project. 
1 The primary statement of the preemption doctrine is found in the NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ 
nss/2002/index.html. The more recent update, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, is largely a 
restatement of the earlier position. 
2 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 701-02 (6th ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES]; Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive 
Force, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 227 (2003); Richard Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War 
Preemption?, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 590 (2003); Miriam Sapiro, War to Prevent War, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 
7, 2003, at 42; Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense (Aug. 2002), available 
at http://www .asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf. 
3 See, e.g., Michael Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 
513 (2003); Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-Emption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209 (2003); 
Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-
Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 576 (2003); John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 563 (2003); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 729 (2004); Lawrence Freedman, 
Prevention, not Preemption, 26 WASH. Q. 105 (2003); Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: 
The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2002, at 24. 
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preserve underlying moral commitments that have shaped the contemporary 
standard in the past. 
Making this argument is important for two reasons. First, the inter-
national processes that shape the customary law of force are more likely to 
validate a change that comes about through a process of adaptation, rather than 
invention. This observation is especially true where a challenged standard has 
achieved widespread recognition over a considerable length of time. Second, 
as this Article will suggest, a longstanding and evolving moral tradition has 
deeply shaped the contemporary standard governing the use of preemptive 
force. The use of lethal force always raises profound moral questions, and the 
imminence standard embodies a shared moral judgment about when 
circumstances justify the use of such force. Altering this standard demands a 
convincing case that revision can preserve these underlying moral 
commitments. 4 
This task requires what Revisionists have so far neglected: an account 
of the contemporary standard in its historical context, as the heir of a 
longstanding, carefully developed moral tradition on the use of preemptive 
force. This Article accepts the conclusion of the Revisionists and suggests that 
an understanding of this larger historical context can inform the current debate 
and strengthen the case for revision. In particular, examining the genesis of the 
contemporary standard offers three crucial insights. First, this account reveals 
that the singular importance attached to the imminence criterion in 
contemporary doctrine marks a notable departure from the tradition in which 
the criterion developed. Although widespread acceptance among states of a 
standard that gives near exclusive importance to the imminence criterion has 
contributed to global security over the past several decades, it is important to 
understand that granting imminence this role is an historic exception-yet an 
exception within a tradition that has sought to limit the use of force. Second, 
this account reveals a complex relationship between the principle of necessity 
and the imminence criterion, in which the former governs the latter. 
Understanding this point is critical, since the contemporary challenge is 
precisely the possibility of a fundamental clash between these two norms. That 
is to say, it is now plausible to imagine a situation where a state has exhausted 
all reasonable alternatives outside the use of force to secure the legitimate end 
of self-defense, but the threat is not imminent, as traditionally conceived. 
Third, and more broadly, this account illuminates the underlying moral 
commitments that have shaped the contemporary standard governing the use of 
preemption and shows how revision might preserve these commitments. 
Part II, "The Contemporary Challenge of Preemption," briefly 
examines the standard governing the use of preemptive force that held sway 
4 Two notable exceptions to this tendency of scholars to assess the issues from a purely 
instrumental standpoint are Martin L. Cook, Ethical and Legal Dimensions of the Bush 'Preemption' 
Strategy, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 797, 807 (2004), and Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, 
The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal, 18 ETHICS AND INT'L AFF. l, 2 
(2004). 
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from at least the end of World War II to 9/11, paying special attention to its 
conceptual structure. Part III, "Preemption and Moral Tradition," traces 
several key moments in the historical development of the contemporary 
standard. Although nearly all commentators point to the celebrated Caroline 
affair as the locus classicus of today's standard, the principles that then-
Secretary of State Daniel Webster announced drew on a longstanding moral 
tradition limiting the use of force. This tradition traces back to the writings of 
Augustine (354-430) and Aquinas (1225-74), early theologians in the 
Christian tradition, although sustained attention to the question of preemption 
did not appear until the early modem period. Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, and 
other luminaries at the dawn of international law refined the standard. Webster 
employed the tradition but made the novel move to apply the imminence 
criterion to states-while previous writers in the tradition had consistently 
limited it to the context of individual self-defense. Finally, Part IV, "Moral 
Tradition and the Case for Revision," applies this historical investigation to the 
contemporary challenge of preemption. 
II. THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE OF PREEMPTION 
A. The Customary Right of Preemption 
The majority of commentators and, arguably, most states recognize a 
limited right of states to use preemptive force as a matter of customary law. 5 
This recognition rests on two arguments. The first argument seeks to explain 
the incorporation of customary law into the Charter system. An important 
ground for incorporation is the text itself. The exception in Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter to the general prohibition on the use of force refers to the 
"inherent" right of self-defense. 6 While not ruling on the question of whether 
customary law includes a right of anticipatory self-defense, 7 the International 
5 For a general overview of this debate, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 97-108 
(2002); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 111-15 (2000); YORAM 
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 165-69 (3d ed. 2001); Oscar Schachter, 
International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984). Critics of 
such a right usually make at least two arguments. The primary argument states that the U.N. Charter's 
Article 51 exception for individual states to use force "if an armed attack occurs" exhausts the possible 
cases in which a state might act in self-defense. Since preemption comes prior to an armed attack, the 
Charter disallows it. DINSTEIN, supra at 166. A second argument concludes that customary law, even 
if it could support such a right, does not. Brownlie takes up this position and argues that the relevant 
time frame for discerning a customary right is the years since the ratification of the Charter. 
Reviewing state practice in these years, he concludes, "since 1945 the practice of States generally has 
been opposed to anticipatory self-defence." See BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 701; IAN 
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 251-80 (1963) [hereinafter 
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL]. 
6 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
7 
"[R]eliance is placed by the Parties only on the right of self-defence in the case of an armed· 
attack which has already occurred, and the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat 
of armed attack has not been raised. Accordingly the Court expresses no view on that issue." Military 
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27). In a later advisory opinion, 
98 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43:95 
Court of Justice concluded in the Nicaragua case (1986) that customary law is 
an independent source of law within the Charter system. 
[T]he United Nations Charter ... by no means covers the 
whole area of the regulation of the use of force in international 
relations. On one essential point, this treaty itself refers to 
pre-existing customary international law; this reference to 
customary law is contained in the actual text of Article 51, 
which mentions the "inherent right" ... of individual or 
collective self-defence .... The Court therefore finds that 
Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that 
there is a "natural" or "inherent" right of self-defence, and it is 
hard to see how this can be other than of a customary nature. 8 
The Court goes on to say that the Charter does not directly regulate all aspects 
of this customary law. Moreover, while the two sources may overlap, 
customary law retains a valid role independent of the Charter. 9 
A second argument finds that a limited right of preemption does in fact 
exist in customary law today. It seems clear that such a right survived 
developments limiting the recourse to force between the two world wars. One 
of the most important events interpreting customary law shortly after World 
War II was a 1946 decision handed down by the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg. This judgment concerned the legality of Germany's 
invasion of Denmark and Norway. The Tribunal rejected Germany's argument 
that it acted in anticipatory self-defense, concluding: "preventive action in 
foreign territory is justified only in case of 'an instant and overwhelming 
necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of 
deliberation."' 10 Citing the important Caroline case, the Tribunal suggested 
that preemptive uses of force are lawful where the anticipated attack is 
a majority of the judges could not conclude that the first use of nuclear weapons would always be 
unlawful if the very existence of the state was in imminent jeopardy. Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 266 (July 8). 
8 Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 94. Another possible ground for 
incorporation is the legislative history of Article 51. Several scholars have argued that the Framers 
did not intend to provide an exhaustive· definition of self-defense in Article 51, relying instead on 
shared customary norms. The specific qualification in the text was rather included as a means to 
clarify the position of the Charter in relation to collective arguments for mutual defense. FLORENTINO 
P. FELICIANO & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 235 (1961); 
C.H.M Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 
RECUEIL DES COURS 451, 498 (1952-11). In dicta in his dissenting opinion to the Nicaragua case, 
Judge Schwebel cited both of these reasons offered by Waldock in support of the claim that the 
Charter preserves the customary right of anticipatory self-defense. Military and Paramilitary 
Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 347-48 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). 
9 Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J at 94. 
10 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences (Oct. I, 1946), 
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172,205 (1947). 
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imminent. 11 Several events since the signing of the Charter also confinn that 
states recognize a limited right to use preemptive force. 12 
B. Necessity and Imminence 
The twin nonns of necessity and proportionality are central to the 
contemporary standard governing the decision to use preemptive force, 
although it is the fonner that is the focus of this inquiry. Scholars commonly 
trace these nonns to the Caroline affair. 13 During the Canadian Rebellion of 
183 7, a group of U.S. sympathizers agreed to support the rebels in their cause 
against the British government. Although the United States had signed a 
neutrality agreement with Britain, the city of Buffalo, New York was far from 
the arm of federal control. A U.S. militia seized Navy Island, a British 
possession in the Niagara River, either on or shortly after December 13, 1837. 
Over the next several days, a privately owned steamboat, the Caroline, made 
repeated trips from the U.S. side of the river to Navy Island, bringing more 
men and supplies. These supplies almost certainly included military 
equipment and ammunition. On the evening of December 29, a British force 
raided the Caroline where it was moored along the U.S. shore. After setting it 
on fire, they towed it into the current where it was swept over the falls. 
In a series of diplomatic exchanges from January 1838 to August 
1842, the U.S. government sought redress for a claimed violation of state 
sovereignty, while the British defended their actions as a necessary means of 
self-defense. 14 Of this correspondence, most important was an April 24, 1841 
letter sent by Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, to the British Minister at 
Washington, Henry Fox. In this letter, Webster outlined a standard to govern 
the conflict, which Fox accepted in subsequent correspondence: "It will be for 
that Government to show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, 
11 
"From all this it is clear than when the plans for an attack on Norway were being made, they 
were not made for the purpose of forestalling an imminent Allied landing, but, at the most, that they 
might prevent an Allied occupation at some future date." /d. at 206. 
12 Exemplary events include: (I) the United States' response to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 
(the Administration's public statements are compiled in Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, 
47 DEP'T ST. BULL. 714 (1962)); (2) the response in the U.N. Security Council to the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War (U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/233 (Jun. 6, 1967); U.N. 
SCOR, 22d Sess., 1350th mtg. at I, U.N. Doc. SIRES/234 (Jun. 7, 1967); U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 
1357th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. SIRES/236 (Jun. II, 1967); U.N. SCOR, 1382th mtg. at I, U.N. Doc. 
SIRES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967)); and, (3) the response in the U.N. Security Council to Israel's bombing of 
the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 (U.N. SCOR, 2288th mtg. at I, U.N. Doc. SIRES/487 (Jun. 
19, 1981)). 
13 For a summary of the history and legal issues involved, see R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and 
McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938). See also Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The 
Caroline Incident and the Development of International Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 493 (1990) 
(arguing that the Caroline incident was vital in the development of limitations on the use of force 
under customary international law). 
14 These letters, as far as the author is aware, are not available in one source. Collectively, 
almost all of this correspondence is in three sources: BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1840-
1841, at 1126-42 (1857); BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1841-1842, at 193-202 (1858); and 
H. EXEC. Doc. 302, 25th Cong. (2d Sess. 1838). 
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leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation," and "the act, 
justified, by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, 
and kept clearly within it."'5 The Caroline case became important for 
international law and the norms governing the use of preemptive force, not 
because states then recognized these norms as binding law in a broad context, 
but because they were appropriated in the last sixty years under the U.N. 
Charter.•• 
Most important for this inquiry is the norm of necessity. Scholars have 
given relatively little attention to the conceptual structure of this norm. 17 As it 
appears in contemporary law prior to 9/11 and in the context of anticipatory 
self-defense, necessity bears on two issues: (1) the existence of reasonable 
alternatives to the use of force, and (2) the temporal proximity of the threat. 
Roberto Ago provides a clear statement of necessity understood as 
"last resort" in his Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility: 
"The reason for stressing that action taken in self-defense must be necessary is 
that the State attacked (or threatened with imminent attack, if one admits 
preventive self-defence) must not, in the particular circumstances, have had 
any means of halting the attack other than recourse to armed force." 18 Ago 
rightly understands necessity in terms of the legitimate end for using force 
("halting the attack"), rather than as a requirement of exhausting even 
improbable alternatives. 
The contemporary doctrine also understands necessity in terms of 
imminence, as a measure of the temporal proximity of the attack. It is 
primarily this requirement of an imminent threat that the Bush Administration 
rejected in the 2002 National Security Strategy, the primary statement on the 
government's new preemption doctrine. 19 Although he does not use the word, 
Webster's statement is the classic expression of the imminence requirement. 
Scholars debate what counts as an imminent threat-and certainly Webster's 
15 
BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1841-1842, at 1137-38 (1858). 
16 It is clear from the comments legal scholars made over the next several decades that the case 
did not have the standing in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that it has today. Lawrence 
only mentions the Caroline episode in the context of the law of neutrality. T.J. LAWRENCE, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 610 (4th ed. 1910). Hall and Oppenheim treat the case as an 
example of the limits on a nonetheless broadly construed right of self-preservation. W. E. HALL, A 
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 283-84 (4th ed. 1895); I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
180--81 (1905). 
17 
Perhaps the most important and comprehensive treatment of these norms is JUDITH GARDAM, 
NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (2004). 
18 
Roberto Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, II-1 [1980] Y.B. lnt'l L. 
Comm'n 13,69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7. 
19 
The document asserts that "we must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities 
and objectives of today's adversaries." NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (2002), supra note 1, at 15. Although the document suggests a process of "adaptation," 
more accurate is the conclusion of then-Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, who stated that 
the concept cannot be a necessary condition of preemptive action: "We must be prepared to act. We 
cannot wait to act until the threat is imminent. The notion that we can wait to prepare assumes that we 
will know when the threat is imminent." Paul Wolfowitz, Remarks before the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (Dec. 2, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/ 
s20021202-depsecdef.htrnl. 
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strong language points to one extreme-yet this debate goes on within certain 
limits. 20 Imminence rules out the first use of force against threats that are 
merely emerging, outside the heat of a crisis. Traditionally, it meant a visual 
mobilization of armed forces preparing for an attack. 
The relationship between necessity and imminence is often overlooked 
or misconstrued. Some scholars have suggested that imminence is an 
altogether separate requirement from necessity. For example, Michael Schmitt 
concludes: "International law requires that any use of armed force in self-
defense, preemptive or otherwise, comply with three basic criteria-necessity, 
proportionality, and imminency. These requirements derive historically from 
the Caroline case."21 Admittedly there is very little consensus on this issue, if 
only because few scholars have addressed it. 
In the contemporary standard, the aspects of necessity as a measure of 
the exhaustion of reasonable alternatives and necessity as a measure of the 
temporal proximity of the threat adhere tightly together. The contemporary 
doctrine holds that a state has exhausted all reasonable alternatives against a 
coming threat of an armed attack only when that threat is imminent. 
Imminence and last resort are not simply two independent measures of 
necessity; rather, the former is a necessary and usually sufficient requirement 
of the latter. As Parts III and IV will suggest, however, this understanding 
marks a notable departure from the past. 
III. PREEMPTION AND MORAL TRADITION 
Nearly all accounts of the right of anticipatory self-defense begin with 
the celebrated Caroline affair but fail to locate the governing norms within a 
much older moral tradition, often referred to as the 'just war tradition." 
Although scholars of international law sometimes make fleeting reference to 
the tradition, the story told is almost always one of gradual demise-a 
historical footnote with scant relevance today. 22 The emergence of the Charter 
20 Schachter represents the more limited version of this right. Drawing on the near-universal 
condemnation by states of Israel's bombing of the Osirak reactor in 1981, he concludes: "We may 
infer from these official statements recognition of the continued validity of an 'inherent' right to use 
armed force in self-defense prior to an actual attack but only where such an attack is imminent 
'leaving no moment for deliberation."' Schachter, supra note 5, at 1635. McDougal holds that the 
Webster standard is too stringent, disallowing self-defense where it may otherwise be necessary. 
"[T]he understanding is now widespread that a test formulated in the previous century for a 
controversy between two friendly states is hardly relevant to contemporary controversies, involving 
high expectations of violence, between nuclear-armed protagonists." Myres McDougal, The Soviet-
Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 598 (1963). Elsewhere, he notes: "[T]he standard of 
required necessity has been habitually cast in language so abstractly restrictive as almost, if read 
literally, to impose paralysis. Such is the clear import of the classical peroration of Secretary of State 
Webster in the Caroline case." FELICIANO & MCDOUGAL, supra note 8, at 217. 
21 Schmitt, supra note 3, at 529. See also John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729,776-
84 (2004). 
22 See, e.g., D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-8 (1958); DINSTEIN, 
supra note 5, at 60-77; FELICIANO & MCDOUGAL, supra note 8, at 131-35. Some treatise writers, 
102 STAN FORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43:95 
system and its restraints on the use of force is often thought to owe little to this 
moral tradition. 23 The attempt to articulate a secular and universal account of 
law, coupled with the rise of positivism, led many scholars to overlook the 
tradition as inescapably tied to religion and natural law theory. This wide-
spread neglect, however, has obscured the more subtle ways in which the 
moral tradition has shaped the law of force today. 
Part III has two aims: to show that the contemporary norms governing 
the use of preemptive force were shaped by the longstanding moral tradition on 
the just war, and to begin showing something about the conceptual structure of 
these norms, particularly the norm of necessity and the related requirement of 
imminence, which appear at the center of the preemption debate. Part IV will 
draw these strands together to show how an understanding of the tradition 
might inform contemporary discussion. 
A. The Beginnings of a Moral Tradition: Augustine and Aquinas 
Neither Augustine (354-430) nor Aquinas (1225-74) ever directly 
took up the issue of preemption, but together they constructed a theory of war 
and its limits, out of which a sustained discussion on the use of preemptive 
force would emerge in the sixteenth century. By all measures, Augustine is the 
most important figure at the beginning of this moral tradition. 24 
The waning of the Roman Empire in the West was part of a larger shift 
from antiquity to the Middle Ages, and Augustine stood at its crux. His inner 
journey to Christianity, recounted in his Confessions, and his eventual 
appointment as a bishop in the North African town ofHippo, are well known. 25 
With the toleration of Christianity and its eventual elevation as the official 
religion of the Empire in the first half of the fourth century A.D., Augustine 
sought to reposition Christianity in this new context. Although recent scholars 
such as Brownlie, simply overlook the tradition altogether. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 
697. 
23 While some voices suggested at that time that the Charter marked a return to the just war idea, 
many scholars openly resisted the idea that this change had any connection to the moral tradition on 
the just war. See, e.g., Josef L. Kunz, Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 528 
(1951); Arthur Nussbaum, Just War-A Legal Concept?, 42 MICH. L. REv. 453 (1943). 
24 
The idea of a jus tum bellum appeared in classical sources well before Augustine. For a 
discussion of this idea in the context of the early Roman fetial practice, see JOHN RICH, DECLARING 
WAR IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC IN THE PERIOD OF TRANSMARJNE EXPANSION (1976); ALAN 
WATSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARCHAIC ROME: WAR AND RELIGION (1993); Thomas 
Wiedemarrn, The Fetiales: A Reconsideration, 36 CLASSICAL Q. 478 (1986). Aristotle was one of the 
earliest writers to talk about a just war. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1255a3-1255b. Among other 
writers, one of the most important to make mention of the just war during the Republican period of 
Rome was Cicero. See, CICERO, ON DUTIES 14-17. Within Christianity, the idea of the just war 
developed in the writings of Eusebius, Chrysostom, and Jerome. Ambrose, Augustine's senior 
contemporary, was especially influential on Augustine's thought. Ambrose's ON THE DUTIES OF THE 
CLERGY borrowed from Cicero's DE OFFICIIS, including his notion of the just war. 
25 For general biographical accounts, see PETER BROWN, AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO (2d ed. 2000); 
GARY WILLS, SAINT AUGUSTINE (2000). For works on Augustine's historical context, see AVERIL 
CAMERON, THE LATE ROMAN EMPIRE AD 284-430 (1993); HUGH ELTON, WARFARE IN ROMAN 
EUROPE ( 1996); PETER BROWN, RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE ( 1972). 
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have challenged the generalization of Christianity as a purely pacifist religion 
in its first few centuries, 26 the move from persecuted sect to ascendant imperial 
religion nonetheless challenged many traditional Christian norms, especially 
those regarding the use of force. Augustine's writings provide a limited case 
for war, rejecting early pacifism, while at the same time providing a 
fundamentally different account of the use of force than the raison d'etat 
notions of the Greeks and Romans. 27 
Augustine identified several criteria for deciding whether or not to use 
force. Although he does not enumerate them as such, his writings suggest that 
a just war will always carry three marks: legitimate authority, just cause, and 
right intention. 28 The first criterion firmly rules out wars among private 
individuals, who can resolve their disputes through the appropriate government 
channels. Moreover, the political community must only go to war for just 
cause. He describes just cause in two ways: as that which precipitates the use 
of force and as the aim, or end in using force. The event precipitating the use 
of force is limited to some injury. 29 The political community must have 
incurred some wrong, otherwise using force is unjust. "To wage war against 
neighbours, and to go on from there against others, crushing and subjugating 
peoples who have done no harm, out of the mere desire to rule: what else is 
this to be called than great robbery?"30 Of course, the effect of this 
requirement in limiting the use of force will depend largely on what counts as 
an injury, and Augustine's understanding is quite broad. 31 Later theorists 
would narrow the types of injury that give rise to just cause. Augustine also 
employs the concept of just cause to identify the proper end in the use of force. 
From this aspect, just cause includes three ends, mentioned throughout his 
26 See, e.g., David G. Hunter, A Decade of Research on Early Christians and Military Service, 
18 RELIGIOUS STUD. REV. 87,87-88 (1992). 
27 Augustine's extended discussions of war as a moral issue are scattered. The primary writings 
include: On Free Will (Book I); Reply to Faustus, the Manichaean, XXII; Sermon 302; Letter 138, to 
Marcellinus; City of God; Letter 189, to Boniface; Questions on the Heptateuch, VI. I 0; and Letter 
229, to Darius. 
28 This requirement of legitimate authority exists in any act of killing. For a person to kill a man 
already condemned to die would be an act of murder, if the assailant were not the person appointed to 
perform the execution. AUGUSTINE, Letter 229, to Darius, in 4 SAINT AUGUSTINE: LETTERS (Wilfrid 
Parsons trans., Fathers of the Church 1956). Likewise, suicide is murder precisely because the person 
who kills himselflacks the authority to do so. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF Goo 26-33 (R.W. Dyson trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998). 
29 
"Just wars are those which have as their object vengeance for injuries received." Augustine, 
Augustine and Just War, 19 AUGUSTINIAN STUD. 37, 66 n.41 (1988) (quoting Questions on the 
Heptateuch). The Roman law concept of iniuria has both a broad and narrow meaning. Broadly 
construed, it means unlawfulness or the absence of a right. Narrowly construed, it is the name of a 
particular delict. Iniuria "embraced any contumelious disregard of another's rights or personality. It 
thus included not merely physical assaults and oral or written insults and abuse, but any affront to 
another's dignity or reputation ... provided always that the act was done willfully and with 
contumelious intent." BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 216 (1962). 
30 AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, supra note 28, at 150. 
31 For example, he finds unjust the Roman war against the Sabines, when the latter sought to 
rescue their stolen women. However, "the Romans might with some justice have waged war against 
that people when they refused a request to give their daughters in marriage," on account of the 
"injury ... by the refusal of marriage." /d. at 70. 
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wntmgs: self-defense, punishment, and the restitution of goods taken. 32 
Lastly, Augustine believes that the morality of killing depends in part on the 
intention of the agent. Killing to gain another's possessions is on the other side 
of a moral divide from killing to rescue a third person whose life is threatened 
with no other means of escape. 33 
While the tradition continued to develop over the next several 
centuries, the most important figure after Augustine is Thomas Aquinas (1225-
74) in the thirteenth century. 34 Aquinas's central intellectual achievement was 
his Summa Theologica. Although his systematic treatment of war is limited to 
a few paragraphs, it became the benchmark for later theorists who would give 
sustained attention to the issue of preemption. In response to the question of 
"whether it is always sinful to wage war," Aquinas writes: 
In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, 
the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is 
to be waged .... Secondly, a just cause is required, namely 
that those who are attacked should be attacked because they 
deserve it on account of some fault. ... Thirdly, it is necessary 
that the belligerents should have a right intention, so that they 
intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. 35 
32 Augustine does not explicitly treat the subject of communal self-defense, though clearly he 
thinks that the use of force to defend the political community is just. His understanding of the role 
that the political community plays in securing a minimal level of order requires that he accept this use 
of force as just. While concluding that most wars are waged out of a lust for domination, Augustine 
(reminding us that his loyalties were not only to Christ, but also to Rome) suggests that the Romans 
built much of the empire through just wars of self-defense. Speaking of wars that expanded the 
empire, he remarks: "Clearly ... the Romans did have a just defence for undertaking and waging 
such great wars. They were compelled to resist the savage incursions of their enemies; and they were 
compelled to do this not by greed for human praise, but by the necessity of defending life and liberty." 
/d. at 104. See also id. at 161-62. The use of force is not limited to stopping an incursion. In his 
Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, Augustine develops a framework for using force in 
individual cases where an injury has already occurred and toward the end of deterrence. See 
AUGUSTINE, COMMENTARY ON THE LORD'S SERMON ON THE MOUNT 62-66 (Denis J. Kavanagh 
trans., Catholic Univ. of America Press 1951 ); AUGUSTINE, Letter 138, to Marcellinus, in 3 SAINT 
AUGUSTINE: LETTERS (Wilfrid Parsons trans., Fathers of the Church 1953). 
33 He argues most forcefully for the importance of intention in his early treatise, On Free Will, in 
AUGUSTINE: EARLIER WRITINGS 115 (John H.S. Burleigh trans., The Westminster Press 1953). 
34 All medieval theories of the just war, including Aquinas's, depended on Gratian's Decretum, a 
compilation of canon law completed around 1140. The most important section concerning warfare in 
the Decretum is Causa 23, which includes a broad selection of Augustinian texts and solidified the 
stamp of Augustine on the tradition. The later Decretists, Decretalists, and theologians, including 
Aquinas, all drew on Gratian's text to develop their just war ideas. The most thorough overview of 
these developments between Augustine and Aquinas is FREDERICK RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE 
MIDDLE AGES (1975). 
35 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1359-60 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 
Benziger Bros. 1948). 
2007 Using Force First: Moral Tradition and the Case for Revision 105 
Outside of this framework Aquinas also discussed other principles 
guiding the decision to use force, including a principle of necessity that would 
play a central role in later accounts of preemption. 36 
B. The Question of Preemption: Vito ria and the Salamanca School 
Although Augustine and Aquinas formed the basic framework of this 
moral tradition in the Middle Ages, it was not until the early modem period 
that proponents of the tradition gave sustained attention to the issue of 
preemption. In so doing, these proponents extended the tradition in two ways. 
First, they developed various tests to determine when just cause, understood as 
an injury, arises absent an actual attack. Second, they refined the principle of 
necessity, a separate and subsequent requirement of exhausting reasonable 
alternatives that took on special importance in this context. Together, these 
norms carved out a limited space for the use of preemptive force. Although 
profound changes in the underlying theory of law accompanied these 
developments, this account will focus on the transmission of the tradition as a 
set of practical norms. 
The most important proponents of the tradition in the early modem 
period were the neo-Thomists of sixteenth-century Spain. 37 The revival of 
Aquinas's thought that they led ensured the transmission of the tradition. 
Among the Spanish neo-Thomists, Francisco de Vitoria (ca. 1485-1546) was 
the earliest and perhaps most important figure. 38 Vitoria studied Aquinas's 
Summa at the University of Paris and returned to Spain in 1523 where he 
eventually taught Theology at the University of Salamanca. His most 
important writings include his commentary on the Summa and several 
36 This principle appears in his discussion of individual self-defense. !d. at 1471-72. The 
historical antecedents of necessity and proportionality lie at least as far back as the Roman law 
concepts of incontinenti and modemamen incu/patae tutelage in the context of individual self-defense. 
The former relates to the norm of necessity and concerns the time in which a person can respond to a 
violent attack upon her person. THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 43.16.3.9 (Alan Watson ed., Univ. of 
Penn. Press 1985). The latter relates to the principle of proportionality and requires moderation in a 
forceful response relative to the circumstances. Both norms appear in this passage from the DIGEST: 
"Those who do damage because they cannot otherwise defend themselves are blameless .... [I]t is 
permitted only to use force against an attacker and even then only so far as is necessary for self-
defense." THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra, at 291. These ideas appear throughout the writings of 
the canonists. 
37 See J.A. FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA, THE STATE, WAR AND PEACE: SPANISH POLITICAL 
THOUGHT IN THE RENAISSANCE 1516-59 (1977); BERNICE HAMILTON, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN 
SIXTEENTH-CENTURY SPAIN (1963); QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT, VOL. II: THE REFORMATION 135-73 (1978). 
38 Following Vitoria were several influential theologians who ensured the influence of Thomistic 
thought in the modem age. These included Dominican theologians such as Domingo de So to ( 1494-
1560) and Fernando Vazquez (1509-66) and later also included Jesuits such as Luis de Molina (1535-
1600) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617). 
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discourses on the nature of civil power and the Spanish conquest in the New 
World. 39 
Vitoria' s primary statement on the issue appears in his commentary on 
the Summa. Responding to Aquinas's classic statement on individual self-
defense in II.II.64. 7, Vitoria asks: "If the Doctor's conclusion is true, i.e., that 
it is lawful to kill an attacking enemy, would it be lawful to anticipate him and 
seek to intercept and kill him?"40 He also asks: 
[I]f I were a poor man, and did not have the wherewithal to 
hire guards and allies, and my enemy were a noble or rich 
man, and I know that he is recruiting guards and allies to kill 
me, then the question is whether it is lawful for me to 
preemptively kill him, "to kill him before he kills me."41 
The hypothetical raises a primary moral question: Can a person use force first, 
in self-defense, if the circumstances are such that failure to do so would deny 
the individual an effective defense? 
Vitoria responds by carving out a limited space for the use of 
preemptive force. His first move is to nuance the concept of just cause in two 
ways: by rethinking the concept of injury and by developing a standard for 
determining when an injury might occur prior to an actual attack. Recall that 
the tradition described just cause in two ways: as that which precipitates the 
use of force and the aim or end in using force. Vitoria draws on the latter 
understanding of just cause to shape his understanding of an injury. In the 
tradition, this concept of injury appeared in its most tangible sense in the case 
of physical attack as an actual harm--a wound inflicted or a blow struck. 
Vitoria concludes that if a person possesses no effective means to defend 
himself, then the concept of injury must be nuanced. Against the charge that 
the person acting in anticipation of an act is the attacker, Vitoria states: "this is 
not to attack, but rather it is to defend oneself. Indeed, the other is attacking 
when he is preparing himself to kill him," assuming that there is "no other 
means to defend oneself ... except preempting the enemy."42 Later writers 
will refer to an "incomplete injury," but Vitoria implies as much in his 
response. While the precipitating event is conceptually prior to the legitimate 
end insofar as the injury gives rise to the end, here the end of self-defense 
shapes the concept of injury. 
39 
The two most important writings are FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On the American Indians, in 
VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS 154 (1991) and FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On the Law of War, in 
VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS 299 (1991), both delivered as lectures in 1539. 
40 
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, REFLECTION ON HOMICIDE & COMMENTARY ON SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE IIA-IIAE Q. 64, 201 (John P. Doyle trans., Marquette Univ. Press 1997) (translator's 
notes omitted). 
41 !d. at 201--{)3. 
42 !d. at 203 
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Vitoria also nuances the concept of just cause by providing a standard 
for determining when this injury arises prior to an actual attack. In other 
words, if the concept of injury in some limited cases extends beyond the actual 
infliction of the harm, what is the standard for determining when this situation 
arises? Extending the example he mentions earlier, Vitoria says that a person 
would be justified in using force if, "supposing that he has journeyed to 
another city, he knows with scientific certitude that his enemy will seek him 
and kill him."43 Although Vitoria's standard is vague, later writers in the 
tradition provide a concrete list of tests that the potential victim must satisfy 
before using preemptive force. 
In addition to nuancing the concept of just cause in these two ways, 
Vitoria's second move is to employ a separate but related principle of 
necessity. He conceives of necessity in terms of "last resort," a requirement 
that the potential victim exhaust all reasonable alternatives prior to using force. 
The man Vitoria describes has "no other way" to defend himself. In 
developing his answer, he explains: 
If the man has some [other] means to defend his life ... he 
should do that and not preemptively strike his enemy. For so 
to strike him would not be a means necessary to defend 
himself "within the bounds of blameless defense," since he 
could defend his life in another way. 44 
While Vitoria develops this account of preemption in terms of individual self-
defense, it seems that he meant it to apply to the commonwealth, as well. 45 
Vitoria's account of preemption is a careful extension of the just war 
tradition. Specifically, Vitoria nuances the concept of just cause and posits the 
principle of necessity as a requirement that the potential victim exhaust all 
reasonable alternatives prior to using preemptive force. Although later 
proponents in the tradition rework the moral theory lying behind it and nuance 
the standard that Vitoria develops, his account becomes the starting point for 
the moral tradition on preemption. 
C. The Imminence Standard: Grotius and Pufendorf 
43 /d. 
44 /d. (emphasis added). This principle does not require that the person relinquish a significant 
amount of his property to avoid using force. Elsewhere Vitoria states: "It is lawful to make armed 
resistance for the defence of property, as admitted in the decretal 0/im causam quae (X.2.13.l2) 
adduced by Nicolaus de Tudeschis." FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On the Law of War, in VITORIA: 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 299 (1991). 
45 In his commentary on the Summa, 11.11.64.8, a marginal gloss on the discussion of the 
preemptive use of force states: "It is lawful for the emperor for the defense of the republic to get a 
start on war, if he knows that another hostile king is conspiring against his kingdom. Therefore, in the 
same way, it is lawful for me to get a start on my enemy." VITORIA, supra note 40, at 234-35 n.246. 
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In the modern period, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Samuel 
Pufendorf (1632-94) were the most important theorists in this evolving moral 
tradition on war and preemption. Grotius was a native of the Netherlands, 
where he lived until 1594. His major work, On the Law of War and Peace, 
was published in 1625. In the final decade of his life he served as the Swedish 
ambassador to France, where he negotiated an agreement by which France 
entered the final stage of the Thirty Years War as an ally of Sweden. He held 
this position until his death in 1645, only a few years prior to the signing of the 
Treaty of Westphalia. 
Grotius's account of preemption is a clear extension of the project 
Vitoria began:6 He was well-versed in the writings of the neo-Thomists, 
especially Vitoria, whom he references extensively:7 Like many modern 
theorists in the tradition, he begins by considering preemption in the context of 
individual self-defense. 
V.-War in defence of life is permissible only when the 
danger is immediate and certain, not when it is merely 
assumed. 1. The danger, again, must be immediate and 
imminent in point of time .... [I]f the assailant seizes 
weapons in such a way that his intent to kill is manifest the 
crime can be forestalled .... 2. Further, if a man is not 
planning an immediate attack, but it has been ascertained that 
he has formed a plot, or is preparing an ambuscade, or that he 
is putting poison in our way, or that he is making ready a false 
accusation and false evidence, and is corrupting the judicial 
procedure, I maintain that he cannot lawfully be killed, either 
if the danger can in any other way be avoided, or if it is not 
altogether certain that the danger cannot be otherwise avoided. 
Generally, in fact, the delay that will intervene affords 
opportunity to apply many remedies, to take advantage of 
many accidental occurrences. 48 
46 Richard Tuck places Grotius wholly on the side of those espousing a permissive account of 
war. "[T]he view taken of Grotius in the conventional histories of international law badly 
misrepresents his real position. Far from being an heir to the tradition of Vitoria and Suarez ... he 
was in fact an heir to the tradition Vitoria most mistrusted, that of humanist jurisprudence." RICHARD 
TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE I 08 ( 1999). Tuck bases this conclusion almost entirely on an 
interpretation of Grotius's view of international punishment and the implications this view has for the 
treatment of native peoples. On this count Grotius and the Salamancan school are on opposite sides, 
and Grotius explicitly rejects their position. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 506 
(photo. reprint 1995) (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925). However, Tuck strangely gives no attention to 
Grotius's view of preemption, an issue Tuck mentions in regard to other figures he considers and a 
place where Grotius is clearly extending the thought of the neo-Thomists. 
47 Grotius cites Vitoria in On the Indies and On the Law of War and Peace 126 times. PETER 
BORSCHBERG & HUGO GROTIUS "COMMENTARJUS IN THESES XI" 48 n.145. (Peter Lang trans., 
1994). In his early and short Commentarius in Theses XI, Grotius cites Vitoria twelve times, more 
than he cites any other person. /d. at 48. Borschberg concludes that Vitoria is the single most 
important influence on Grotius. /d. at 47-49. 
48 
HUGO GROTIUS, supra note 46, at 173-75. 
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Like Vitoria, Grotius thinks of an injury as beginning earlier than the actual 
blow. When he extends this discussion to public wars, he refers to "a wrong 
action commenced but not yet carried through."49 
Grotius moves beyond Vitoria in identifying several criteria for 
determining when someone has the requisite certainty that an enemy will 
attack. Implied in the passage above, and stated directly in his discussion of 
public war, is a requirement that the person considering the use of force 
discern the certain intent of the enemy to attack. By itself, intent is never a 
sufficient ground for the use of preemptive force, but it is a necessary ground. 
The aggressor must also possess sufficient means to attack. The enemy is one 
who has weapons. In addition, the potential aggressor must manifest some 
kind of active preparation. The aggressor not only chooses an end and has the 
means to reach that end, but also has done something active toward that end: 
"he has formed a plot, or is preparing an ambuscade, or ... is putting poison in 
our way, or ... is making ready a false accusation and false evidence."50 
Finally, the attack must also be imminent. Grotius is the first major theorist in 
the tradition to mention this criterion in his discussion of preemption. In the 
example provided, the enemy "seizes weapons in such a way that his intent to 
kill is manifest. " 5' There is some outward act that initiates the attempt to harm 
such that the actual harm is close at hand. While the requirements are distinct, 
an imminent attack almost always entails the two other requirements, as well. 
In addition to considering the concept of just cause in the context of a 
coming harm, Grotius also articulates the independent principle of necessity: 
A person cannot use force to stop a coming danger that gives rise to just cause 
if some reasonable alternative to the use of force exists. Grotius states the 
principle often as a general limitation on the use of force, 52 and it is evident in 
this passage as well. The examples he mentions-someone who has "formed a 
plot" or is "putting poison in our way"-are all examples where the potential 
attack falls short of being imminent. 53 In these situations Grotius generally 
rules out the use of preemptive force, with the important exception that a 
person can act where she is certain that she cannot avoid the danger in any 
other way. The operative principle here is necessity: "Generally, in fact, the 
delay that will intervene affords opportunity to apply many remedies."54 The 
idea is that where the threat is not imminent, it is almost always the case that 
there is some other reasonable alternative for neutralizing the threat. 
Imminence, it seems, serves as a proxy for necessity. 
49 !d. at 184. 
50 !d. at 174. 
51 /d. at 173. 
52 For example, speaking of private wars of self-defense, Grotius writes: "If an attack by 
violence is made on one's person, endangering life, and no other way of escape is open, under such 
circumstances war is permissible, even though it involve the slaying of the assailant." /d. at 172-73. 
53 !d. at 174. 
54 !d. at 175. 
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Grotius next considers preemption in the context of the state. "What 
has been said by us up to this point, concerning the right to defend oneself and 
one's possessions, applies chiefly, of course, to private war; yet it may be 
made applicable also to public war, if the differences in conditions be taken 
into account."55 He mentions several differences. The individual right of self-
defense remains only as long as the individual lacks effective protection from 
the public powers. Where this protection is available and effective, the right 
lapses. 56 Grotius goes on to say that the requirement of an imminent threat 
does not apply in the context of state self-defense. "[F]or [states] it is 
permissible to forestall an act of violence which is not immediate, but which is 
seen to be threatening from a distance ... by inflicting punishment for a wrong 
action commenced but not yet carried through."57 Grotius does not explain 
why the standard for states is more lenient, though one reason is likely the need 
to create a credible deterrent. Deterrence is one of the primary goals of 
punishment for Grotius and it is the exclusive task of the state. 58 
In his primary section on the state's use of preemptive force, Grotius 
again makes the point that certainty of the aggressor's intent alone is never 
sufficient. 59 The intent must be "revealed by some fact," some action that is 
meant "to bring this about."60 The act must be "planned and initiated."61 It 
seems that the other criteria are all relevant: certain intent; sufficient means; 
and active preparation. In addition to these requirements and absent an 
imminent threat, Grotius adds the additional requirement of magnitude of 
harm. 
Crimes that have only been begun are therefore not to be 
punished by armed force, unless the matter is serious, and has 
reached a point where certain damage has already followed 
from such action, even if it is not yet that which was aimed at; 
or at least great danger has ensued. 62 
In sum, Grotius significantly advances the tradition's account of preemption, 
providing a set of criteria for determining when just cause arises absent an 
actual attack, as well as introducing the requirement of imminence into the 
tradition as a limitation on individual self-defense. 
After Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94) was the most important 
theorist in the tradition to develop these norms governing the use of 
55 /d. at 184. 
56 !d. 
57 !d. (emphasis added). 
58 !d. at 8-9, 472-78. 
59 /d. at 503. 
60 /d. 
61 /d. 
62 /d. at 504. 
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preemptive force. Pufendorfs career included both government service and 
teaching law and philosophy. 63 Westphalia was perhaps the single most 
important event shaping the political context in which he wrote. 64 His primary 
work was On the Law of Nature and Nations, published in 1672. His account 
follows the analysis first laid down by Vitoria and refined by Grotius, which 
provided several measures for when just cause arises absent an actual attack 
and developed a separate principle of necessity understood as last resort. Like 
Grotius, Pufendorf analogizes individual to state self-defense. 
Pufendorfs standard is more stringent for an individual in civil 
society: 
It seems possible to lay down the general rule that the 
beginning of the time at which a man may, without fear of 
punishment, kill another in self-defence, is when the 
aggressor, showing clearly his desire to take my life, and 
equipped with the capacity and the weapons for his purpose, 
has gotten into the position where he can in fact hurt me, the 
space being also reckoned as that which is necessary, if I wish 
to attack him rather than to be attacked by him. 65 
He provides as an example an assailant wielding a sword and charging another 
person, intending to kill in a matter of seconds. As for Grotius, the individual 
under the protections of the social contract and considering the use of 
preemptive force must look to the temporal proximity of the attack, as 
measured by its imminence. 66 
Pufendorf takes up the issue of preemption in the context of rejecting 
the fear of a powerful neighbor as a just cause for war, which other proponents 
of a more permissive account of preemption, such as Gentili and Bacon, had 
defended. 67 · 
63 For background on Pufendorfs life, see SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND 
CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW xiv-xxxvii (Michael Silverthorne trans., James Tully ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) [hereinafter PUFENDORF, DUTY OF MAN] as well as SAMUEL 
PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 1la-{)2a (photo. reprint 1995) (C.H. Oldfather 
& W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934) [hereinafter PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE]. 
64 For an historical account of the conflict, see RONALD G. ASCH, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR: 
THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE AND EUROPE, 1618-1648 (1997). A helpful summary of the significance 
of these events for the formation of the international social order is ADAM WATSON, THE EVOLUTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 169-97 (1992). 
65 PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 63, at 276. 
66 /d. at 277. 
67 Strongly influenced by the humanist tradition, Gentili (1552-1608) granted a broad allowance 
for the use of preemptive force. 
I call it a defence dictated by expediency, when we make war through fear 
that we may ourselves be attacked. No one is more quickly laid low than one 
who has no fear, and a sense of security is the most common cause of 
disaster .... Therefore ... those who desire to live without danger ought to meet 
impending evils and anticipate them. 
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Fear alone does not suffice as a just cause for war, unless it is 
established with moral and evident certitude that there is an 
intent to injure us. For an uncertain suspicion of peril can, of 
course, persuade you to surround yourself in advance with 
defences, but it cannot give you a right to be the first to force 
the other by violence to give a real guarantee, as it is called, 
not to offend .... For so long as a man has not injured me, and 
is not caught in open preparation to do so ... it should be 
presumed that he will perform his duty in the future. 68 
43:95 
Certain intent and active preparation are explicit requirements, and presumably 
the latter also includes sufficient means. Again, even if just cause arises, the 
state considering the use of preemptive force must also satisfy the requirement 
of last resort. 69 At no point, however, does Pufendorf predicate the 
permissibility of preemption in this context on the presence of an imminent 
threat. 
D. The Moral Tradition in Eclipse: Vattel, Kant, and Hall 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a permissive tradition 
on the use of force gained ascendancy, mirroring geo-political developments 
that followed in the hundred years after Westphalia, particularly the coming of 
age of strong, sovereign states. The early modem origins of this rival tradition 
trace most immediately to Machiavelli's Prince. On the issue of preemption, 
Machiavelli ( 1469-1527) is predictably blunt: 
Wise rulers ... have to deal not only with existing troubles, 
but with troubles that are likely to develop, and have to use 
every means to overcome them. For if the first signs of 
troubles are perceived, it is easy to find a solution; but if one 
lets trouble develop, the medicine will be too late. 70 
ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLE LIBRI TRES (ON THE LAW OF WAR] 61 (John C. Rolfe 
trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1925). Gentili's ideas on preemption were almost certainly 
passed to Francis Bacon (1561-1626), his contemporary and friend. In Bacon's 1624 discourse, 
Considerations Touching a War with Spain, Bacon urged England to make war with Spain, which was 
growing in power. He invoked the same standard-"wars preventive upon just fears are true 
defensives"-and urged such a war, in order to maintain a balance of power in Europe. FRANCIS 
BACON, Considerations Touching a War with Spain, in THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, VOL. II, at 
202 (Basil Montagu ed., A. Hart 1852). 
68 PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 63 at 1296. 
69 /d. at 1295. 
70 
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE I 0-11 (Quentin Skinner and Russell Price eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (emphasis added). 
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He praises the Romans who knew that "wars cannot really be avoided 
but are merely postponed," and therefore chose to start them at a time and 
place of their choosing. 71 These ideas were continued in the writings of 
Thomas Hobbes ( 1588-1679), who provides an enduring theoretical 
foundation for this rival tradition. For Hobbes, preemption is the practical and 
inevitable outcome of the "state of nature," a condition where individuals or 
states exist outside the social contract and without any higher governing 
authority. Describing this condition as a state of war, Hobbes concludes: 
[In the state of nature], there is no way for any man to secure 
himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by forces, or 
wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he 
see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is 
no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally 
allowed. 72 
As this permissive account gained increasing intellectual acceptance, 
the moral tradition on the just war was gradually eclipsed. Emmerich de Vattel 
(1714-67) reflects this shift among writers who take up the tradition. Vattel 
was born in Prussia, though he spent most of his career in diplomatic service as 
an adviser to the Elector of Saxony. His most important work was The Law of 
Nations (1758), which was widely influential, especially in the United States. 
In a chapter entitled "The Just Causes of War," Vattel repeats the general lines 
of the just war tradition regarding the decision to use force. 73 Nonetheless, he 
describes a standard that considerably weakens the norms espoused by Grotius 
and Pufendorf. For example, where a state anticipates a future harm that meets 
all of the criteria seen earlier, Vattel says that the state should look for the 
"smallest wrong" as an occasion to use force. 74 He later concludes: "There is 
perhaps no case in which a State has received a notable increase of power 
71 /d. at 11. 
72 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88 (Richard Tucked., 1996). "Feare of oppression, disposeth 
a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his 
life and liberty." /d. at 71-72. 
73 Vattel claims: 
The right to use force, or to make war, is given to Nations only for their 
defense and for the maintenance of their rights .... We may say, therefore, in 
general, that the foundation or the cause of every just war is an injury, either 
already received or threatened. 
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 243 (photo. reprint 1995) (Charles G. 
Fenwick trans., 1916). 
Even where a state has just cause for war because of some actual injury that has occurred, the 
natural law forbids a state to resort to armed force before it has exhausted other reasonable 
alternatives. !d. at 245-48. Later Vattel says that, in an offensive war (war toward the ends of 
reparation and punishment), the use of force is only just if it is marked by an "inability to obtain the 
thing otherwise than by force of arms. Necessity is the sole warrant for the use of force." !d. at 246. 
Elsewhere he explicitly adopts the language of"last resort." /d. at 243. 
74 !d. at 250. 
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without giving other States just grounds of complaint. Let all Nations be on 
their guard to check such a State, and they will have nothing to fear from it."75 
Furthermore, Vattel also places limits on the tradition's scope of applicability. 
While its restraints on the use of force apply "to the conscience of sovereigns," 
they are not meant to structure actual relations between states. 76 States must 
assume that both sides to the conflict hold a just cause. 77 Vattel gives several 
reasons for this confinement of the moral norms, the most important of which 
is an outworking of the Hobbesian idea that states are free moral persons living 
in a state of nature: 
It belongs to every free and sovereign State to decide in its 
own conscience what its duties require of it, and what it may 
or may not do with justice. If others undertake to judge of its 
conduct, they encroach upon its liberty and infringe upon its 
most valuable rights. 78 
In surprising ways, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) affirms Hobbes's 
account of preemption. For Kant, war is an instrument Nature employs to 
drive humanity toward perfection and a more just order. The condition of fear 
and actual hostilities between states will eventually lead them to enter a 
voluntary federation, governed by law and supported by a credible sanction. 79 
Even wars of aggrandizement are a part of this movement. 80 The changes, 
however, are gradual and Kant is clear that war plays an indispensably positive 
role in the present. "So long as human culture remains at its present stage, war 
is therefore an indispensable means of advancing it further; and only when 
culture has reached its full development-and only God knows when that will 
be-will perpetual peace become possible and of benefit to us."8' The result is 
a complex normative account of war in the present. While Kant obliges states 
finally to leave this state of war, he sanctions a permissive account of the use 
of preemptive force under the present conditions and into the foreseeable 
future. 
75 /d. Vattel's position is complicated, and both T.J. HOCHSTRASSER, NATURAL LAW THEORIES 
IN THE EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT 181 (2000) and TUCK, supra note 46, at 193-95 err in simply 
identifying Vattel with a raison d'etat tradition on the use of force. Vattel is moving in this direction, 
but he is better interpreted as a transitional figure. 
76 VATTEL, supra note 73, at 188-89, 304. 
77 
"[R]egular war, as regards its effects, must be accounted just on both sides." /d. at 305. 
78 /d. at 304. Vattel first makes this claim in the preface to his work. He concludes that the 
voluntary law of nations can be derived simply from the concept of states as free moral persons in a 
state of nature. /d. at 9a-l Oa. 
79 
IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 47 (Hans 
Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1970). 
80 /d. at 51. 
81 
IMMANUEL KANT, Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History, in KANT: POLITICAL 
WRITINGS, supra note 79, at 232. 
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By failing to exit the state of nature, each state commits a wrong 
against another and thereby gives occasion for war. 82 This constant wrong that 
states commit against each other merely by refusing to leave the state of nature 
is sufficient grounds to use force. Kant explains, "it is not necessary to wait 
for actual hostility; one is authorized to use coercion against someone who 
already, by his nature, threatens him with coercion."83 Furthermore: 
In addition to active violations ... [the state] may be threatened. This 
includes another state's being the first to undertake preparations, upon 
which is based the right of prevention (ius praeventionis), or even just 
the menacing increase in another state's power (by its acquisition of 
territory) .... This is a wrong to the lesser power merely by the 
condition of the superior power, before any deed on its part, and in the 
state of nature an attack by the lesser power is indeed legitimate. 
Accordingly, this is also the basis of the right to a balance of power 
among all states that are contiguous and could act on one another. 84 
Despite Kant's optimism for a just international order among states, he 
largely accepts Hobbes's description of the present as a state of war in which 
states can rightfully use preemptive force against each other on the mere basis 
of fear. Kant's account of preemptive force represents the triumph of the 
Hobbesian tradition at the close of the eighteenth century, a tradition that 
would inform the jus ad bellum for international law as it blossomed into a 
distinct discipline in the nineteenth century. 
Perhaps the best example of this development is Edward Hall's 
popular Treatise on International Law (1880). 85 Hall posits that states have at 
least two basic rights: the right of independence, 86 and the right of self-
preservation. 87 He defines the former as "a right possessed by a state to 
exercise its will without interference on the part of foreign states in all matters 
and upon all occasions with reference to which it acts as an independent 
community."88 Likened to the individual moral agent in the state of nature, 
states have a right to conduct their own internal affairs as they see fit without 
intervention from other states. 
82 
IMMANUEL KANT, Toward Perpetual Peace, in IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 
322 (note) (Mary J. Gregor trans., 1996). 
83 
IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysics of Morals, in IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, 
supra note 82, at 452. 
84 !d. at 484. 
85 
HALL, supra note 16. 
86 /d. at 50. See also HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-83 (photo. 
reprint 2002) (1836). 
87 
HALL, supra note 16, at 45. See also WHEATON, supra note 86, at 81, 209; THEODORE D. 
WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-18, 43-45 (photo. reprint 
1998) (5th ed. 1879); OPPENHEIM, supra note 16, at 177-179. 
88 
HALL, supra note 16, at 50. See also WHEATON, supra note 86, at 82-83. 
116 STAN FORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43:95 
In tension with this right of independence, however, is the related right 
of self-preservation.89 "[S]ince states exist, and are independent 
beings ... they have the right to do whatever is necessary for the purpose of 
continuing and developing their existence, of giving effect to and preserving 
their independence."90 Where the right of independence clashes with the right 
of self-preservation, Hall is clear that the latter prevails. "In the last resort 
almost the whole of the duties of states are subordinated to the right of self-
preservation. Where law affords inadequate protection to the individual he 
must be permitted, if his existence is in question, to protect himself by 
whatever means necessary." 91 
Hall describes a sweepingly broad account of self-preservation, which 
justifies the use of force not only in the case of an actual or imminent attack, 
but also in the case of a mere threat. 
If a country offers an indirect menace through a threatening 
disposition of its military force ... [and] if at the same time its 
armaments are brought up to a pitch evidently in excess of the 
requirements of self-defense, so that it would be in a position 
to give effect to its intentions ... the state or states which find 
themselves threatened may demand securities ... and if 
reasonable satisfaction be not given they may protect 
themselves by force of arms. 92 
Hall agrees that states may use preventive force early on to avoid 
going to war later. 93 An attempt to upset the balance of power between the 
major powers may provide legitimate grounds for a preemptive attack. By the 
nineteenth century, Hobbes's account of states existing in an international state 
of nature and bound by few or no restrictions in deciding to use force had 
triumphed. 
E. Webster and the Caroline Case in Context 
Although the just war norms governing the use of preemptive force 
were largely eclipsed in international law during the nineteenth century, it was 
89 Other scholars use different terms for the latter right, including expansive notions of self-
defense, self-help, and necessity. For a more extended account of the different terms scholars use for 
this right, see BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL, supra note 5, at 41. 
90 
HALL, supra note 16, at 45. See also OPPENHEIM, supra note 16, at 177-79; WHEATON, 
supra note 86, at 81, 209; WOOLSEY, supra note 86, at 6-18,43-45. 
91 
HALL, supra note 16, at 281. "The same right to continued existence which confers the right 
of self-development confers also the right of self-preservation, and a point exists at which the latter of 
the two derivative rights takes precedence of the duty to respect the exercise of the former by another 
state." !d. at 46. 
92 Jd. at46-47. 
93 ld. at 297-99. 
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this tradition that Secretary of State Daniel Webster drew upon in his 1842 
letter to Fox. Recall the standard announced by Webster and accepted by the 
British: "It will be for that Government to show a necessity of self-defense, 
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation. "94 
Webster's correspondence relating to the Caroline episode and other 
contemporary sources give no indication as to how Webster arrived at this 
standard. Earlier sources, however, indicate that he was directly acquainted 
with the writings of several theorists already examined. In an early 
autobiographical fragment, Webster mentions reading Vattel and Pufendorf 
while practicing law in Boston."5 More importantly, Webster's 1826 argument 
before the Supreme Court in the case of the Marianna Flora, an otherwise 
obscure case, shows Webster addressing some of the same issues that arose in 
the diplomatic flurry that surrounded the sinking of the Caroline more than a 
decade later. It also shows Webster drawing on some of the key figures in the 
developing moral tradition on preemption. 
The facts in this earlier case were relatively undisputed. 96 In 1819 
Congress passed an act creating enforcement powers against piracy and slave-
trafficking. A year later the USS Alligator was launched to patrol the high 
seas, under the command of Lieutenant Robert F. Stockton. In 1821, on its 
second voyage, the Alligator came upon a ship bearing no flag and seemingly 
signaling distress. As the U.S. vessel approached the unidentified ship, 
however, the latter began firing. The volleys continued even after the Alligator 
raised the U.S. flag. Suspecting that pirates were attacking his ship, Stockton 
continued to approach the other vessel and returned fire. Only after a near 
miss did the other ship hastily raise a Portuguese flag. Although neither vessel 
had struck the other, the Alligator gained the upper hand and seized the 
Portuguese ship. Lieutenant Stockton bound the crew and sent the ship to 
Boston for trial in a U.S. court. 
The case eventually arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court. In the interim, 
the U.S. government had requested that the crew, the vessel, and its cargo be 
released and sent back to Portugal. At issue before the Court was only the 
question of whether Lieutenant Stockton was liable for damages in sending the 
Marianna Flora to Boston rather than releasing the ship, as the District Court 
judge had ruled. Arguing on behalf of Stockton, Webster took up the same 
question that would arise a little more than a decade later in the case of the 
94 30 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1841-1842, supra note 14, at 195. 
95 
DANIEL WEBSTER, THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: CORRESPONDENCE, VOL. I, 1798-
1824, at 17 (Charles M. Wiltse ed., 1974). 
96 The Marianna Flora (D. Mass Feb. 9, 1822), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Appellate 
Case Files (No. 15Q.-{)2, micro-copy no. 214), rev'd, 16 F. Cas. 736 (Cir. Ct., D. Mass. 1822) (No. 
9,080), aff'd, 24 U.S. I (II Wheat. I) (1826). See also HENRY WHEATON, WHEATON'S NOTES 
REGARDING THE MARIANNA FLORA ( 1826) (on file with The Pierpont Morgan Library, New York). 
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Caroline: when can a party justifiably use force in self-defense against an 
approaching threatt' 
In arguing for a standard, Webster and his co-counsel George Blake 
borrowed from the rules governing individual self-defense, which they found 
in both the common law and the natural law. Henry Wheaton, the Court 
reporter at that time, summarizes their arguments before the Supreme Court: 
Still less can it be maintained that the Portuguese had 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the Alligator was a pirate, 
and had hostile designs upon his ship, and, therefore, he had a 
right to attack and destroy her. The analogies of the municipal 
law may assist to illustrate this branch of the inquiry. What 
degree, or what grounds of fear of bodily harm, will justify an 
act that may result in the destruction of human life, is, in some 
cases, a question of great delicacy and difficulty. By the rules 
of the common law, the rights of the party assailed are 
confined within very narrow limits. The danger must be 
manifest, impending, and almost unavoidable. 98 
Arguing also from the natural law, Wheaton recounts that Blake and Webster 
go on to quote Pufendorf at length in support of the same conclusion: 
But the writers on natural law may, perhaps, on this occasion, 
be more properly cited; and the following passage from 
Puffendorf affords the fullest illustration of the principles 
applicable to this subject .... "[B]efore I can actually assault 
another under colour of my own defence, I must have tokens 
and arguments amounting to a moral certainty that he 
entertains a grudge against me, and has a full design of doing 
me a mischief, so that, unless I prevent him, I shall 
immediately feel his stroke. Among these tokens and signs 
giving me a right to make a violent assault upon another man, 
I must by no means reckon his bare superiority to me in 
strength and power."99 
97 Webster's interest in the undertakings of the Alligator began with the vessel's maiden voyage 
in April 1821. Supported in part by the American Colonization Society, of which Webster was a 
member, the Alligator sailed to the west coast of Africa where Stockton among others negotiated the 
purchase of present day Liberia as a place to return U.S. slaves. 
98 
The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S at 16-17. Webster and Blake's brief for the Court no longer 
exists. According to early practice, however, the Supreme Court reporter included a summary and, in 
some cases, a partial transcript of the oral arguments presented by both sides. In this case, Wheaton's 
notes are quite extensive. 
99 !d. at 17-18. 
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Webster invokes the very tradition on the use of force that developed from 
Vitoria through Pufendorf. As Part IV will discuss, however, he does so by 
invoking the standard for individuals and applying it to states acting 
preemptively in their own defense. The standard includes clear intent, 
sufficient means, and, although he does not use the language, a measure of 
temporal proximity that is best described as a requirement of imminence. As 
Secretary of State fifteen years later, Webster again drew on the tradition to 
determine when a state can use preemptive force in the Caroline case. For 
nearly one-hundred years, scholars gave this episode only passing attention. '00 
Although nearly all accounts of the contemporary norms governing the use of 
preemptive force start with Webster, this account shows Webster reaching 
back much further and enlisting the longstanding moral tradition on the just 
war. 
IV. MORAL TRADITION AND THE CASE FOR REVISION 
Beginning with Vitoria in the sixteenth century and continuing through 
Webster, a distinct moral tradition on the use of preemptive force emerged. 
The purposes of this narrative were to identify this tradition, to begin 
understanding its conceptual structure, and to reveal its contribution to the 
international norms governing the use of preemptive force today. As 
suggested earlier, an understanding of these norms as they developed within 
the moral tradition is important for understanding the role played by the 
imminence criterion in the tradition and the relationship of imminence to other 
norms governing the use of force, in particular the requirement of necessity. 
This account is also important for making the case that a careful expansion of 
the right to use preemptive force can preserve the underlying moral 
commitments that have shaped these norms in the past. As this concluding 
Part will suggest, the moral tradition has much to say about why the 
contemporary tradition, which requires foremost that the threat be imminent, 
might evolve under the new threat of global terrorism. 
A. The Rejection of Imminence in the Context of State Self-Defense 
Revising the law of anticipatory self-defense requires a careful 
rethinking of the concept of imminence. The narrative sketched earlier 
suggests two reasons for revising the law of preemptive force in a way that 
does not give the requirement of imminence near exclusive importance, but at 
100 From !841 to 1914, the Caroline Case received passing reference primarily in the limited 
context of justifiable violations of neutrality for the sake of "self-preservation." See DANIEL 
GARDNER, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (1844); H.W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
555-56 (1861); LAWRENCE, supra note 16, at 521-22; OPPENHEIM, supra note 16, at 187; ROBERT 
PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 184-85 (1854-61); WOOLSEY, supra note 
87, at 269. 
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the same time preserves underlying moral commitments that have shaped the 
evolving standard governing the use of preemptive force in the past. First, this 
narrative suggests that, prior to Webster, the tradition rejected the requirement 
that states can resort to preemptive force only in the face of an imminent threat. 
This conclusion is not to say that the tradition was silent on the issue of 
preemption; as Part III examined, the tradition developed a standard for the use 
of preemptive force that looked to multiple points of assessment. Rather, the 
criterion of imminence applied exclusively to the case of individual self-
defense in the context of a functioning government. Recall that Vitoria, the 
most important early theorist in the tradition to extend the just war norms to 
the question of preemption, never mentioned this criterion concerning the 
temporal proximity of the attack. 
With Grotius came a discussion of imminence in the context of 
individual self-defense. 
War in defence of life is permissible only when the danger is 
immediate and certain, and not when it is merely assumed. 
The danger, again, must be immediate and imminent in point 
of time .... [I]f the assailant seizes weapons in such a way 
that his intent to kill is manifest the crime can be 
forestalled .... 101 
The mere drawing up of plans and other preparations for an attack are 
insufficient; the attacker must initiate the actual movement that will result in 
the victim's harm. Turning to the use of preemptive force by the state, 
however, Grotius makes this qualification: "What has been said by us up to 
this point ... applies chiefly, of course, to private war; yet it may be made 
applicable also to public war, if the differences in conditions be taken into 
account." 102 He is explicit that a state need not wait until the threat is 
imminent, in the stringent sense described in the case of individual self-
defense. Rather, a state can "forestall an act of violence which is not 
immediate .... " 103 
Pufendorf also requires that individuals under a functioning 
government only use preemptive force against a threat that is imminent. He 
emphasizes that this criterion requires that, in addition to the clear intent to 
harm and means to do so, the aggressor must also be near in space and time, 
and must have begun the action that will result in the victim's harm. The 
example he provides is of an attacker charging with weapon drawn, though still 
101 GROTIUS, supra note 46, at 173. 
102 /d. at 184 (emphasis added). 
103 /d. He explains this difference in terms of punishment. While individuals have a right to use 
force for self-defense, only states have a right to use force toward the two additional ends of restoring 
goods taken and punishing wrongdoers. Although later theorists in the tradition place preemption in 
the category of self-defense, for Grotius it is a form of punishment. 
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at some distance. For states, the criteria of certain intent, sufficient means, and 
active preparation all apply, but imminence is noticeably absent. For Grotius, 
Pufendorf, and other early sources of international law, imminence is a 
requirement for the use of preemptive force by individuals under the 
protections of a functioning government, but not a requirement for states or 
individuals absent such protections. Although these theorists analogized the 
state to the individual, they consistently refused to condition the use of 
preemptive force by states on the presence of an imminent threat. 
Without any explanation for his departure from the tradition to which 
he appealed, Webster applied the standard for individuals within a political 
community to states. In his 1826 oral argument to the Supreme Court in the 
case of the Marianna Flora, Webster references both Grotius and Pufendorf in 
describing the standard that states must meet for preemptive action. 
By the rules of the common law, the rights of the party 
assailed are confined within very narrow limits. The danger 
must be manifest, impending, and almost 
unavoidable .... "[B]efore I can actually assault another under 
colour of my own defence, I must have tokens and arguments 
amounting to a moral certainty .... so that, unless I prevent 
him, I shall immediately feel his stroke." 104 
Webster's description of imminence is even more stringent in his letter to the 
British: "the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and 
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." 105 
In his argument before the Court in The Marianna Flora, Webster 
makes explicit reference to "the rules of the common law." 106 The standard he 
articulates is similar to that found in Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the 
Laws of England was enormously influential in the new republic. Blackstone 
treats the subject of anticipatory self-defense in his chapter, "Of Homicide." 
He distinguishes three common law categories of homicide: justifiable, 
excusable, and felonious. Anticipatory self-defense falls within the second 
category. His account expresses a stringent understanding of imminence. 
[T]he self-defence, which we are now speaking of, is that 
whereby a man may protect himself from an assault .... This 
right of natural defence does not imply a right of attacking: 
for, instead of attacking one another for injuries past or 
impending, men need only have recourse to the proper 
tribunals of justice. They cannot therefore legally exercise 
104 The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. at 13-14. 
105 
BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1841-1842, supra note 14, at 20 I. 
106 
The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. at 13-14. 
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this right of preventive defence, but in sudden and violent 
cases when certain and immediate suffering would be the 
consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law. 
Wherefore to excuse homicide by the plea of self-defence, it 
must appear that the slayer had no other possible (or, at least, 
probable) means of escaping from his assailant. 107 
43:95 
Although Blackstone does not use the term imminence, his standard is the 
same. 
Blackstone's rationale for this stringent standard is the same found in 
Grotius and Pufendorf: individuals within a state and faced with a threat 
usually "have recourse to the proper tribunals of justice." Therefore, a 
"preventive" attack against an "impending" threat is typically ruled out; in 
these cases a civil remedy is available. Rather, the threat must be "certain and 
immediate" to justify attack. Although Blackstone's subject is English 
common law, he mentions in the next paragraph that the same standard does 
not govern relations between independent nations. 108 Webster and Blake, 
however, obscure this distinction. They acknowledge that the Marianna Flora 
and the Alligator were in a "state of nature" when they confronted each other 
on the ocean. 109 However, the imminence standard they defend before the 
Court-and in support of which they quote Pufendorf-is the standard that 
both Pufendorf and the larger tradition of which he was a part had limited to 
individuals exercising self-defense under the protections of a functioning 
government. This easy transference of the standard for preemptive action in 
the case of individual self-defense to the same in the case of state self-defense 
might not be nearly as questionable if, in fact, the tradition up to that time and 
the very writers Webster cites had not made such a clear distinction between 
the governing standards in these two different contexts. 
Why did Webster substitute one standard for the other? It is important 
to remember that Webster is not making any sweeping generalizations about 
when states can use preemptive force. States recognized few restraints on the 
use of force during the nineteenth century. Webster's cases were quite 
particular: in the first, a case of perceived piracy; and in the second, a case of 
the use of force by one state against another under a bilateral neutrality 
agreement. It was only later as scholars and statesmen appropriated Webster's 
language in the mid-twentieth century that the standard applied more broadly. 
Moreover, Webster was a lawyer trying to make the strongest case he could on 
behalf of his clients, even if it required a creative departure from his sources. 
In the cases of both the Marianna Flora and the Caroline, Webster's purpose 
was well-served by an especially stringent standard for preemptive action, a 
standard requiring an imminent threat. In the twentieth century, and especially 
107 
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 183. 
108 /d. at 185. 
109 24 U.S. at 12. 
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after World War II, Webster's standard was appropriated in part to provide 
historical legitimacy for the widespread effort to limit the use of force. 
In sum, until Webster and the retrieval of Webster's standard in the 
twentieth century, the evolving tradition on the use of preemptive force near 
universally rejected the requirement that states can resort to preemptive action 
only in the face of an imminent threat. While the Webster standard as 
appropriated under the Charter system was an attempt to limit the overall use 
of force, it was from its inception a notable departure from the tradition. Of 
course, Webster's move to apply the imminence criterion to states did not take 
place in the absence of any restraints. The tradition had developed a nuanced 
account, taking into consideration the differences between states and 
individuals and developing several factors to decide when a state could take 
preemptive action. While the requirement of an imminent attack as applied to 
states has served the international system well in the past several decades, the 
new threat of global terrorism has altered the circumstances in such a way that 
this standard can no longer provide states with the security they require. As 
this narrative suggests, an evolving standard that no longer gives singular 
importance to the requirement of an imminent threat is not the departure from 
tradition that preservationists and even revisionists often describe. 
B. The Priority of Necessity 
Most important, the narrative also suggests that the principle of 
necessity governs the criterion of imminence. Recall that the tradition 
consistently required that even where an individual or a state has just cause for 
preemptive action, the same must also meet the independent requirement of 
necessity. In other words, the individual or state must exhaust all reasonable 
alternatives short of using force, which is always a last resort. The narrative 
points to a special relationship between the requirement of imminence, where 
it applies, and the principle of necessity, an independent criterion that applies 
in all cases of preemptive action. In short, the requirement of an imminent 
threat served as a proxy for the more fundamental requirement that the use of 
preemptive force be necessary. 
Although Grotius requires an imminent threat as a general constraint 
on individuals using preemptive force under the protection of a political 
community, recall that he does so with a qualification. 
[I]f a man is not planning an immediate attack ... I maintain 
that he cannot lawfully be killed, either if the danger can in 
any other way be avoided, or if it is not altogether certain that 
the danger cannot be otherwise avoided. Generally, in fact, 
the delay that will intervene affords opportunity to apply 
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many remedies, to take advantage of many accidental 
occurrences .... 
110 
Read closely, this passage allows an individual to use preemptive force where 
the threat is something less than imminent if there is no other way to avoid 
certain harm. 
The justification for this broader allowance rests on the relationship 
between imminence and necessity: namely, that necessity is the underlying 
moral requirement, requiring that the potential victim have no other means to 
avoid what is otherwise certain to happen. The requirement of imminence, 
then, functions as a useful proxy for necessity: the use of preemptive force is 
necessary if the coming threat of harm is so near in space and time that the 
potential victim lacks any other means to escape receiving the first blow except 
by using force first. In the context of a functioning government, this proxy 
makes sense, since generally individuals can appeal to the state for protection. 
Grotius makes an exception, however, in some cases where the threat is not 
imminent but the person subject to attack lacks any other effective means to 
defend against a harm that is certain to come. This exception is not 
problematic, however, insofar as imminence is only a proxy for necessity, and 
does not require anything finally independent of it. Grotius recognizes that 
making such a judgment is difficult, especially since the time between the 
present and when the attack is imminent can give rise to "many accidental 
occurrences"'" that might allow a person to protect herself without using 
preemptive force. Nonetheless, he recognizes that in a very limited set of cases 
waiting for the threat to be imminent will effectively preclude a sufficient 
defense. Although Grotius, like everyone else in the tradition after him, 
requires that states only use force as a last resort-when the use of such force 
is necessary-he does not limit such uses of force to imminent threats. 
Lacking the protections of a higher authority, states may, in some limited 
cases, need to use preemptive force. A general requirement of imminence 
would fail to capture the differences in this context. 
Pufendorf s writings reflect the same close relationship between the 
requirements of imminence and necessity. He explicitly defines imminence in 
terms of necessity. Addressing the standard for preemptive action by an 
individual in civil society, Pufendorfwrites: 
[I]t seems possible to lay down the general rule that the 
beginning of the time at which a man may, without fear of 
punishment, kill another in self-defence, is when the 
aggressor, showing clearly his desire to take my life, and 
equipped with the capacity and the weapons for his purpose, 
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has gotten into the position where he can in fact hurt me, the 
space being also reckoned as that which is necessary, if I wish 
to attack him rather than to be attacked by him. 112 
125 
In other words, an imminent attack is an attack so near in space and time that 
the potential victim has no alternative but to attack first, if she is to avoid 
taking the first blow. In the case of individual self-defense in civil society, 
imminence functions as a proxy for necessity. By not requiring an imminent 
threat for states or individuals outside civil society, Pufendorf implicitly 
acknowledges that there are some situations in which a state, lacking recourse 
to a higher authority, may have no reasonable alternative but to use force to 
defend itself against a threat that, at the time, is less than imminent. Again, 
necessity is the fundamental moral measure. 
Webster's standard, although applying the imminence standard to 
states as well as to individuals, follows along the same lines. As in Grotius and 
Pufendorf s writings, imminence and necessity bear a close relationship to 
each other. The first half of Webster's standard-"a necessity of self-defense, 
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberatiori"--explicitly defines necessity in terms of imminence. Using force 
is necessary because the threat is "instant," so near in time that the victim has 
"no choice of means" to defend herself; she can only strike first with force. 
Yet when Webster's standard is interpreted outside of the larger tradition of 
which it is a part, it is hard to discern the nuanced relationship between these 
two requirements as they developed in the tradition. Webster's language 
suggests a near identity between the two requirements, with no clear reason to 
think that necessity is more fundamental. Moreover, since Webster applies the 
requirement of an imminent threat in both the individual and state contexts, 
there is less of a vantage point from which to discern the relationship between 
the principle of necessity and the imminence criterion. Commentators and 
states routinely cite Webster for the contemporary standard and the same 
confusion appears today. 
As suggested earlier, it is now plausible to think that the requirements 
of imminence and necessity might in some cases clash at a fundamental level. 
That is to say, one can now imagine a situation where a state has exhausted all 
reasonable alternatives outside the use of force to secure the legitimate end of 
self-defense, but the threat is not imminent. The narrative in Part III and this 
analysis provide a means to sort out this conflict. The tradition has always 
conceived of imminence as a proxy for the more fundamental requirement of 
necessity, understood as last resort. Where necessity is satisfied but the threat 
is not imminent, the tradition is clear that necessity must govern. An imminent 
threat almost always makes the use of force necessary if a state is to defend 
itself, but in the absence of an imminent threat the use of force might still 
satisfy the principle of necessity. In contemporary doctrine, the function of the 
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imminence criterion as a proxy for necessity has calcified, obscuring the 
relationship between these two concepts and giving the imminence criterion a 
fixed place in the standard that it previously did not possess. Although the 
temporal proximity of the threat will always inform judgments about whether a 
particular use of force is necessary, the tradition on its own terms provides 
grounds for a standard that does not grant the imminence criterion exclusive 
importance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While it is possible that the circumstances shaping some areas of 
international law might change so radically that states would need to craft 
altogether new norms, the contemporary challenge of preemption does not 
present such a case. Revisionists shoulder the weighty burden of showing that 
revision can preserve important moral commitments that have profoundly 
shaped the present standard governing the use of preemptive force. This 
investigation has suggested two grounds for believing revisionists can meet 
this burden. First, prior to Webster the moral tradition consciously and 
consistently rejected the requirement of an imminent threat in the context of 
state self-defense. Second, the tradition always assigned priority to necessity 
and demanded the presence of an imminent threat only in the context of 
individual self-defense, and then only as a proxy for the more fundamental 
requirement of necessity. 
Although not the focus of this inquiry, achieving legitimacy will also 
require that revisionists offer an acceptable alternative standard. The 
emergence of imminence as the predominant criterion in assessing uses of 
preemptive force had the effect of obscuring other points of moral assessment 
developed within the tradition. These other criteria included certainty of 
intent, sufficiency of means, active preparation, magnitude of harm, and 
probability of harm. In one sense, these measures were preconditions of an 
imminent threat. With the exception of magnitude of harm, an imminent threat 
presumably satisfied all these requirements. Once the criterion of imminence 
emerged as a necessary condition for the use of preemptive force, it assumed 
near exclusive importance. If the standard can no longer require an imminent 
threat in every instance, then these other criteria in the moral tradition may 
serve as a rich resource for developing a new standard-one that is continuous 
with the underlying norms that have informed the doctrine in the past, but 
takes into account the realities of today. 
